The structuring and transformation of myth is presented as a function of a number of brain “operators.” Each operator is understood to represent specifically evolved neural tissue primarily of the neocortex of the brain. Mythmaking as well as other cognitive processes is seen as a behavior arising from the evolution and integration of certain parts of the brain. Human ceremonial ritual is likewise understood as the culmination of a long phylogenetic evolutionary process, and a neural model is presented to explain (...) its properties. Finally, the mechanism by which ritual is used to resolve the antinomies of myth structure is explored. (shrink)

We consider only the relationship of consciousness to physical reality, whether physical reality is interpreted as the brain, artificial intelligence, or the universe as a whole. The difficulties with starting the analysis with physical reality on the one hand and with consciousness on the other are delineated. We consider how one may derive from the other. Concepts of universal or pure consciousness versus local or ego consciousness are explored with the possibility that consciousness may be physically creative. We examine whether (...) artificial intelligence can possess consciousness as an extension of the interrelationship between consciousness and the brain or material reality. (shrink)

. The phenomenology of certain mystical states is contrasted with the sense of “baseline” reality in an exploration of primary senses of reality. Nine theoretical and eight actual primary senses of reality are described. A neurophysiological model is presented to account for these states, and their possible adaptive significance is considered from an evolutionary perspective. Finally the state of absolute unitary being is contrasted with baseline reality, and their competing claims for primacy are evaluated in an epistemological context.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the intellectual elite generally believed that religion would soon vanish because of the advent of the Higher Criticism and the scientific method. However, two hundred years later, religions and the concept of God have not gone away and, in many instances, appear to be gaining in strength. This paper considers the neuropsychological basis of religion and religious concepts and tries to develop an understanding of why religion does not go away so easily. In (...) general, religion appears to serve two major functions—it is a system of self‐maintenance and a system of self‐transcendence. Since both of these functions bear directly on human survival and adaptability, the neuropsychological mechanisms that underlie religions appear to have become thoroughly ingrained in the human gene pool and ultimately human experience. This paper reviews these two functions of religions from a neuropsychological perspective to try to explain why religion continues to thrive. Finally, we consider the conclusions regarding reality and epistemology that a neuropsychological analysis of religious experience suggests. (shrink)

An analysis of the underlying neurophysiology of aesthetics and religiousexperience allows for the development of an Aesthetic‐Religious Continuum. This continuumpertains to the variety of creative and spiritual experiences available to human beings. This mayalso lead to an understanding of the neurophysiological mechanism underlying both“positive” and “negative” aesthetics. An analysis of this continuumallows for the ability to understand the neurophenomenological aspects of a variety of humanexperiences ranging from relatively simple aesthetic experiences to profound spiritual and unitarystates such as those obtained during (...) meditation. However, it may be possible through aneuropsychological analysis to determine the similarities that exist across such experiences.Thus, certain parts of the brain may be functioning in similar ways during different experiences.It may be the case that the specific neuropsychological components of a given experience maydepend on the strength of the affectual response of the person and the ability to mark suchexperiences as significant. Further, even though similar structures may be functioning duringdifferent experiences, their inhibitory and excitatory interactions may be different. Finally, byconsidering the Aesthetic‐Religious Continuum, we may eventually arrive at a betterunderstanding of how we experience and define reality. (shrink)

. Human ceremonial ritual is considered as an evolved behavior, one of the principal effects of which is the promotion of intragroup cohesion by decreasing or eliminating intragroup aggression. It is seen as a major determinant of what Victor Turner calls communitas in human social groups of varying extension. The frequent paradoxical effect of ritual's promoting extragroup aggression at the same time that it diminishes intragroup aggression is considered. A neuroevolutionary model of the development and social effects of ritual behavior (...) is presented, being derived from both ethology and recent neurophysiological studies in humans. (shrink)

This paper considers the neuropsychology of religious and spiritual experiences. This requires a review of our current understanding of brain function as well as an integrated synthesis to derive a neuropsychological model of spiritual experiences. Religious and spiritual experiences are highly complex states that likely involve many brain structures including those involved in higher order processing of sensory and cognitive input as well as those involved in the elaboration of emotions and autonomic responses. Such an analysis can help elucidate the (...) biological correlates of these experiences and provide new information regarding the function of the human brain. (shrink)

This chapter extends biogenetic structural theory to a consideration of the biopsychological principles underlying higher phases of consciousness, particularly those attained by the systematic exploration of consciousness called contemplation. The concepts of psychic energy, flow, centeredness, energy circulation, and dreambody are explored as presented in various mystical traditions, and a model of the underlying neurophysiology is presented in terms of ergotropic-trophotropic tuning. The psychophysiology of various forms of meditation together with emergent peak experiences is examined and integrated into the ergotropic-trophotropic (...) tuning model. Structural invariance of ergotropic-trophotropic tuning as well as invariant aspects of contemplation across different cultures and associated with different symbol systems is considered. Finally the nature and implications of Void Consciousness, God Consciousness, or Abssolute Unitary Being are examined. (shrink)

In the past few decades, neuroscience research has greatly expanded our understanding of how the human brain functions. In particular, we have begun to explore the basis of emotions, intelligence, and creativity. These brain functions also have been applied to various aspects of behavior, thought, and experience. We have also begun to develop an understanding of how the brain and mind work during aesthetic and religious experiences. Studies on these topics have included neuropsychological tests, physiological measures, and brain imaging. These (...) different techniques have enabled us to open up a window into the brain. It is by understanding the functioning of the creative brain that we begin to understand the concept of the creative mind. It is through the use of emotions and other higher cognitive functions that the brain and mind can create ideas, music, literature, and ultimately our entire repertoire of behaviors. How these different creative abilities are derived can also be traced to various parts of the brain and how they function. Modern neuroscience allows us to begin to understand the creative aspect of the brain and mind and perhaps can take us one step further toward understanding the most profound types of aesthetic and religious experiences. (shrink)

The Golden Rule has received remarkably little philosophical discussion. No book has ever been written on it, and articles devoted to it have been exceedingly few, and usually not very searching. It is usually mentioned, where it is mentioned at all, only in passing, and most of these passing remarks have either been false, trite, or misleading, though some of them, as we shall see, have certainly been interesting enough. Considering its obvious importance and its almost universal acceptance, this dearth (...) of philosophical discussion is unfortunate, and also somewhat surprising. One of the things I hope to show about it, though only incidentally, is that there are problems connected with it of the utmost subtlety, worthy of the attention of even the most minute philosophers. (shrink)

Though ‘evil’ is often used loosely as merely the generic opposite of ‘morally good’, used precisely it is the worst possible term of opprobrium available. In this essay it is taken as applying primarily to persons, secondarily to conduct; evil deeds must flow from the volition to do something evil. An evil action is one so horrendously bad that no ordinary decent human being can conceive of doing it, and an evil person is one who knowingly wills or orders such (...) actions. Malignant evil—doing evil because it is evil—is not just possible but real, and is one of several kinds of evil delineated. There are incidental discussions of cruelty, Rosenbaum on Explaining Hitler, Baumeister on Evil, and Benn on wickedness. Footnotes1 Dedicated to Alan Gewirth, in honour of his 90th birthday, and in appreciation of his superb, illuminating, and ground-breaking philosophical work over many years. (shrink)

Marcus G. Singer; X—Meaning, Memory, and the Moment of Creation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 187–202, https.

What is considered in this paper is the Hobbesian contention that there is no morality without government and consequently that there can be no moral criticism of government. It is argued that there are vital shifts in the way Hobbes thinks of rights, duties, and justice, without which outright contradictions result. Thus the Hobbesian claim that, in a state of nature, everyone has a right to everything, is equivalent to the claim that, in a state of nature, no one has (...) a right to anything. But on Hobbes’ own account there must be rights as well as duties in a state of nature, hence also justice and injustice. It is argued that confusion about duties and justice as well as rights results from failing to distinguish rights from liberties and from power. (shrink)